Survey evidence has revealed large differences in beliefs held by different cultures and ethnicities which may affect their economic prosperity. We study how the beliefs of New Zealand's indigenous Māori about the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate differ from non-Māori using World Values Survey data from 1995 to 2011. Māori are more likely to believe that (1) the poor have been unfairly treated and are not lazy; (2) a better life is due to luck and not hard work; (3) the Government is doing too little for those in need; and (4) business should not be run solely by the owners, compared to non-Māori. We control for income, education and employment status, inter alia. The paper also compares differences between Māori and non-Māori within NZ to those between (non-indigenous) blacks and non-blacks within the US, as a benchmark. Stark results hold with respect to non-economic beliefs: whereas Māori are 8.6% more likely to believe that the environment should be given priority over economic growth compared to non-Māori, blacks are 20.5% less likely to hold this view compared to other Americans. Hence the evidence suggests that being indigenous plays a role in belief formation.
Introduction
Striking differences in economic outcomes exist within New Zealand (NZ) for the indigenous Māori population relative to the non-Māori population, and particularly relative to the dominant population group which is of European extraction (commonly termed Pākehā). In 2006, for instance, onefamily households with children that included Māori adults had a median equivalised household income that was 74% of the equivalent figure for households with no Māori adults.
1 Furthermore, outcomes for a wide range of broader social indicators show considerable relative disadvantage for Māori relative to others in the population. For example, life expectancy for Māori is, at present, seven years less compared to nonMāori, and over half of the prison population is Māori, in spite of Māori representing around 15% of the population. 2 Similar differences have been found to exist in the US between the black and non-black population. In both NZ and the US, a large literature has sought to explain the reasons behind these kinds of ethnicity-based differentials.
One reason, often highlighted, is the lower educational achievement amongst Māori. 3 Without diminishing the importance of education, this paper concentrates on another point of difference that may explain different outcomes. Specifically, we analyse whether certain beliefs and values differ systematically between Māori and non-Māori. The economic (and some of the non-economic) beliefs and values that we examine have been linked consistently in the international literature to the adoption of particular individual actions that may affect economic outcomes. For example, a person who believes that the world is not 'just'
(perhaps in the sense of not believing that success comes from individual effort but instead is due to luck and connections) may not be motivated to seek educational achievements in the first place, nor see the point of working hard at a job.
A person's beliefs and values form a part of their culture. A distinguished tradition in social science, particularly important in sociology since the work of Max Weber, has considered culture as a key determinant of individual effort and the overall quality of the formal institutions that support market friendly exchange (e.g., Weber, 1946) . The 'values paradigm' in sociology assumes that "culture can shape action by supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed, thus making values the central causal element of culture" (see Swidler, 1986, p273) . For example, cultures that emphasize materialism and individualism may have very different economic development paths from those ones that don't place much value on the accumulation of wealth and individual success. For the purposes of our paper, it is important to note that a common set of formal institutions (rules, laws, constitutions) at the national level does not 1 See Kiro (2010) . 2 In the 2013 census in NZ, 74% of the population identified with at least one European ethnicity, 15% identified with Māori ethnicity, 12% with at least one Asian ethnicity, 7% with at least one Pacific Island ethnicity, and 1% with some other ethnicity. The totals sum to more than 100% due to some individuals identifying with more than one ethnicity (source: Statistics New Zealand). 3 In 1971, only 12% of Māori school-leavers held sixth form certificate or above (Coleman et al, 2005) . By 2012, the proportion who passed the equivalent qualification, NCEA Level 2, had risen to 54% but this figure compared with a non-Māori pass-rate of 74% (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2014) . Using 2001 data, Sin and Maré (2004) showed that differences in qualifications account for 29% of the gap in incomes between Māori and European incomes.
necessarily generate a uniform culture. Immigrant and minority groups, for example, may hold very different beliefs and values from the dominant culture. Along these lines, one of the ways that researchers have measured the role of culture, holding institutions constant, is by looking at the way immigrants from different countries behave in the same destination country.
Our paper finds that Māori have a significantly different distribution of economic beliefs and values from non-Māori. We use, for the first time, World Values Survey data to identify these differences within the NZ context. For example, Māori are 11.5% more likely to believe that the causes of wealth come from connections and luck, instead of individual effort, and are 18.2% more likely to believe that the poor have been unfairly treated, compared to non-Māori. These beliefs are accompanied by a greater expectation that the State should help those in poverty. Some of these differences are also found when comparing the economic beliefs of minority groups in other countries, like blacks in the US, to the non-black population.
This raises the question as to whether there are other kinds of beliefs that more uniquely distinguish Māori.
For example, maybe being indigenous creates certain cultural differences compared to non-indigenous groups. We find evidence for this proposition in the sense that one important non-economic belief of
Māori differs markedly from that of blacks in the US. Specifically, whereas Māori are more likely to emphasize protecting the environment (even at the cost of economic growth) compared to non-Māori, the reverse is true for black Americans. That is, blacks strongly support giving less priority to the environment, compared to non-blacks.
Aside from the potential of the different beliefs and values of Māori that we identify to help account for different outcomes, our survey evidence also has relevance for the optimal design of institutions within NZ. Given the dispersion of beliefs that make up NZ culture, creating a common set of formal rules for the whole population becomes harder. For example, our World Values Survey findings suggest that Māori beliefs are more aligned with giving importance to collectivism, non-materialism, the environment and kinship ties, compared to non-Māori. Māori are more likely to believe that owners of firms should not be given free rein to run them (and other groups, like employees, should be involved);
that capitalists are the most threatening group to society; and that the environment should get priority over economic growth. Some of these cultural traits may explain why Māori enterprises appear to be built more on a stakeholder approach, rather than a shareholder approach, the latter being the dominant form of governance of firms in the Anglo-Saxon world (i.e., in countries like the UK, US, Australia and NZ).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide some background as to how certain cultural norms and institutions that are relevant to Māori versus non-Māori may affect economic outcomes.
We also provide background on Māori economic institutions and outcomes compared to those of the general population in NZ. Section 3 discusses our World Values Survey (WVS) data and empirical approach to testing whether beliefs and values that are relevant to behaviour differ between Māori and non-Māori. Section 4 presents our empirical results. In order to provide an external benchmark for any patterns of difference that emerge across ethnicities within NZ, we apply the same techniques to compare black and non-black respondents within the US. In section 5, we link our empirical results regarding beliefs to issues of governance and institutional design within both Māori organisations and the wider society. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) define 'culture' as being "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation" and review the work on how culture affects, and is affected by, a nation's institutions. 4 North (1990) defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, convention, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics." In North's theory, formal rules are created by the polity, whereas informal norms are "part of the heritage that we call culture". 5 As Alesina and Giuliano (2015) point out, the problem with this definition of "institutions" is that it overlaps too much with culture, since "norms" and "conventions" are used to define both institutions and culture.
Background

Culture and Institutions
Given this ambiguity, when we refer to institutions we mean formal institutions (i.e., formal legal systems, formal regulation) and when we refer to culture we mean beliefs and values (one could say 'informal rules').
This approach is the one followed by Alesina and Giuliano (2015) and also in most of the empirical papers trying to disentangle the two concepts.
While some early studies showed that cultural attitudes are slow to change, a recent comprehensive study by Giavazzi et al (2014) shows that persistence in cultural attitudes (e.g., of migrants to the US) differs across attitudinal categories and by country of origin. Of relevance to our study, attitudes related to family values (for example, the importance of obedience of a child) are shown to be strongly persistent across generations whereas attitudes towards issues such as redistribution and the importance of work versus luck for success display relatively strong convergence amongst migrants to the dominant culture.
The speed of attitudinal convergence towards the societal norm depends in part on the strength of the family (or kin) as a social organisation, with weaker ties being associated with stronger convergence (since vertical transmission of attitudes within families is weaker). 6 A number of studies show that aspects of culture differ within countries either as a result of migrant groups retaining cultural attitudes from their source society or as a result of regional variations within countries. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) conclude 4 See, for example, Bowles, 1998. 5 Other disciplines have long placed emphasis on culture, for instance Weber (1905) in sociology and Tylor (1871) in anthropology. Within modern sociology, Bourdieu and Passeron (1973) pioneered the concept of 'cultural capital' which includes customs transmitted across generations within societies. 6 This finding mirrors the early work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1973) who regard 'cultural capital' as a form of knowledge, skills, education and advantages that a person possesses, and which parents transmit to their children through shaping their attitudes and knowledge which in turn affects their outcomes within the educational system. that national institutions do not necessarily generate a uniform culture. Few studies examine the convergence of minority indigenous group attitudes towards those of a dominant settler group (Belich, 2009 ) which is our focus in analysing differences between Māori and non-Māori attitudes within NZ.
The importance of culture for economic outcomes emerges across a number of dimensions. 7 A variety of studies surveyed by Alesina and Giuliano (2015) shows that greater emphasis on individualism (relative to collectivism) translates into greater emphasis on personal achievements to obtain advancement, thus also emphasizing entrepreneurial activities and innovation. 8 The strength of family ties correlates with strong trust and cooperation within the family network but with weaker ties to other portions of society.
9
Strong family ties tend to translate into an industrial structure based on family (or kinship) firms. Often such firms tend to under-perform relative to others for reasons including a tendency towards greater riskaversion and also the use of the firm as a quasi-social security provider to provide jobs within the relevant kinship group (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bloom and van Reenan, 2007) . In addition, Alesina and Giuliano (2015) discuss how strong family ties may reduce geographic labour market mobility, leaving pockets of unemployed or under-employed people in declining areas, while strong family ties are also associated with a lack of political participation. Both outcomes appear relevant to Māori.
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Another important economic dimension affected by culture relates to attitudes towards work and poverty. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) summarise evidence showing that beliefs in personal success being determined more by luck than hard work tend to be associated with lower social mobility. However, Di Tella et al (2007) show that this belief is not immutable. They examine the impact on beliefs of the allocation of land titles to squatters in Buenos Aires. Those squatters who received land titles subsequently held beliefs about the workings of the free market that were statistically indistinguishable from the general community, whereas those squatters who did not receive land titles retained significantly less pro-market beliefs. While this kind of individual experience may affect beliefs and hence economic outcomes, it is also the case that deeply ingrained cultural norms matter for societal outcomes. Using African data, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) test for the effects of ethnicity versus national borders, and hence national institutions. They establish that if ethnicity (as a proxy for culture) is included as an explanatory variable then national institutions have no discernible effect on local economic performance. Given these findings, we provide background from previous studies on Māori beliefs and values, and on Māori relative economic and social outcomes, in the next section.
7 See, for example, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) who correlate different measures of beliefs with economic growth rates across countries and compare them with institutional and geographical determinants of income. 8 For a theory of collective beliefs that helps explain why many people feel a need to believe that we live in a "just" world where individual effort pays off and the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in levels of redistribution, labor supply, aggregate income, and popular perceptions of the poor, see Benabou and Tirole (2006) . 9 Consistent with this observation, empirical work has found stronger family ties for Māori compared to non-Māori. Roskruge et al., 2012 and 2013 , report lower levels of generalised trust of others amongst Māori, controlling for personal characteristics. 10 The correlation coefficient across New Zealand regions for the percentage of regional population that is Māori and the regional unemployment rate in 2013-14 is 0.83 (data source: MBIE, 2014). Voter turnout in the Māori electorates in the 2014 general election was 65% compared with 79% for the general electorates (source: Electoral Commission, "Electoral Results", 2014).
Māori Beliefs and Values
Historical accounts of Māori life suggest conflicting views as to the importance of various types of family ties. Firth (1959) Another key aspect of chieftanship was access to wealth and the consequent ability to exert influence. Firth (1959) discusses the importance of wealth for a chief in order to maintain his position.
Wealth was required to entertain travellers and visitors of note, as well as to keep strong relationships with relatives and tribal members. As in other Pacific societies, reciprocity (gift giving) was central to economic relations, with a chief's largesse in terms of gifts reciprocated through labour and other services (see Malinowski, 1921 and 1922) . Firth (1959) These historical characteristics of the tribal chief coupled with the traditional (and possibly ongoing) importance of kinship, mean that a number of findings in the international literature regarding the importance of family ties and collectivist economic beliefs (which are stronger in some societies than others) may translate through to Māori economic relationships today. However, as Firth pointed out, executive capacity was traditionally required for a chief to maintain rank and authority. Thus even in a traditional tribal setting, there is some ability to ensure that governance is not linked solely to the persona of an hereditary figure.
There is a scarcity of modern empirical literature investigating whether Māori and non-Māori share common beliefs and values (whether traditional or more modern) and whether they perceive differently the notion of well-being. A number of studies have examined whether there are differences in terms of measures of objective well-being (e.g., Cooke et al, 2007; Kiro et al, 2010) and subjective well-being (e.g., Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and Lawson, 2008; Sibley et al, 2011). 14 Each of these studies shows that Māori have lower (objective or subjective) well-being than do non-Māori. For instance, Kiro et al (2010) document that (in 2006) households with at least one Māori adult have worse outcomes than households with the same family structure with no Māori adult in terms of education, home ownership, household crowding, smoking prevalence and health. Furthermore, controlling for family structure, households with two Māori adults perform worse on each of these dimensions than do households with one Māori adult.
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The presence of differences in well-being determinants has been highlighted by Durie (2006) who postulates that there exist culturally-specific components of Māori well-being for which comparisons cannot be made with other ethnicities. 16 These components include utility gained from affiliation with one's iwi and hapū, visiting one's marae and participation in kapa haka. 17 Durie's conceptual model of Māori well-being (called "Tapa whā") proposes that overall well-being for Māori consists of four parts: i)
Taha whānau (Family health); ii) Taha wairua (Spiritual health); iii) Taha tinana (physical health); and iv) Taha hinengaro (mental health). Durie (2006) contends that all four components must be maintained in order to remain in a high state of well-being. Spiller (2011) 
Māori Economic Characteristics
Prior to European settlement in the late 18 th and early 19 th centuries, Māori traditionally lived in small agricultural settlements growing limited crops supplemented by hunting and fishing (Firth, 1959 Pauling and Ataria (2010) state: "For many years Ngāi Tahu, along with several other iwi, has consistently voiced a largely misunderstood and often lone concern for the way waste is managed in NZ … Much of the concern has focused around the treatment and disposal of human effluent, especially where it is discharged to water, and of the need to protect significant cultural values such as mahinga kai and wāhi tapu. The importance of water and waterways to Māori underpins a broad support for alternative waste management strategies that involve land application. Despite these concerns being widely acknowledged and dealt with through a number of high profile legal disputes, Māori concerns have continued to grow. Many Māori believe that little is being done to understand Māori concerns and that there is a widespread lack of support for changing the current waste management paradigm in favour of more sustainable and alternative solutions that include some form of land treatment or that result in reduced use and degradation of water, and consequently valued mahinga kai resources. land was sold in the early to mid-19 th century (often in questionable circumstances) and a sizeable portion was also confiscated by Government during the mid-19 th century land wars. In 1840, Māori owned 29.9 million hectares of land, falling to 15.3 million ha (in 1852), 5.0 million ha (in 1891), 2.2 million ha (in 1920) and to a low of 1.2 million ha (in 1986). Thereafter, several settlements between Crown and Māori relating to historical injustices saw total Māori land holdings rise to 1.5 million ha (in 1996) . While sale at low prices Zealand was a pioneer (Sutch, 1966) . 22 At the same time, existing Māori land holdings were developed into commercial farm units, providing jobs and incomes for local Māori (NZIER, 2003) .
The collectivist approach to economic institutions within Māori society was reinforced by Government actions (supported by iwi leaders) from the 1980s onwards. Durie (1998b) 25 The BERL study assumes that Māori enterprises (excluding Trusts) have the same average number of employees by sector as in the total economy (with the average across the total economy being 9.5 employees per enterprise). Other studies have assumed that Māori enterprises are, on average, smaller than other enterprises, implying that BERL's estimated asset base of the non-Trust sector is likely to be an upper bound. By contrast, there is reasonable certainty over the (more objectively determined) data for Māori Trusts. Hence the Māori Trust sector is likely to comprise at least 29% of all Māori assets. This ratio appears to be larger than for NZ as a whole, despite the importance of agricultural cooperatives in the economy. Estimates of the size of the nation's cooperative sector vary. The UN Global Census on Cooperatives (Dave Grace, 2014) ranks NZ as having the world's largest cooperative sector according to employees as a ratio of population and according to cooperatives' revenues as a percentage of total value added (GDP). The latter figure is 20%, implying that value-added by cooperatives as a ratio of GDP is considerably less than 20%. According to the International Cooperative Alliance, 3% of NZ's GDP is generated by co-operatives. See: http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-facts-figures. 26 The purposes of the Māori Fisheries Act 2004 include: "to provide for the development of the collective and individual interests of iwi in fisheries, fishing, and fisheries-related activities in a manner that is ultimately for the benefit of all Māori" and "to establish a framework for the allocation and management of settlement assets through (a) the allocation and transfer of specified settlement assets to iwi as provided for by or under this Act; and (b) the central management of the remainder of those settlement assets." 27 Te Puni Kokiri (2007) documents that for Māori trusts and incorporations which are registered under the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, the return on equity in 2005 (1.8%) and the return on total assets (1.2%) was broadly equivalent to the respective economy-wide returns in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, but well below those of the total economy (10.2% and 4.0% respectively). 28 Sen (1999, pp. 121 ) notes the similarities of "precapitalist values and habits of thought" with modern advocacy of protected markets and the "preservation of antiquated techniques and production methods in businesses owned and operated by a 'protected bourgeoisie'", and comments on the benefits of markets in reaping benefits by overcoming such restrictions.
outcomes and the design of institutions. Our results are benchmarked against a comparison of black and non-black Americans.
Data and Empirical Approach
The main source of our data is the World Values Survey (WVS). We use data on three waves . 29 At times, we will use 'beliefs' to encompass both beliefs and values. A challenge of our approach is to select out of these opinions an appropriate set to study. We study beliefs that are economically relevant, though also select a set of non-economic beliefs (some of which may indirectly affect economic outcomes) as a benchmark. Thus, our study is focused on two "cultural domains", namely economic and non-economic.
Economic Beliefs
In addition to the economics literature on the importance of cultural beliefs for economic outcomes (as discussed in section 2), there is also a vast literature in political science discussing the nature of political beliefs (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1856, and Lipset, 1979 . See also the discussions in Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 1988; Inglehart, 1990, and Zaller, 1991) . Some of this work emphasizes how left/right political choices reflect the basic cleavages in society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) , for example, argue for the importance of the religious and the class (or economic) cleavage.
A large part of the variation in the latter that explains party choice can be captured by an individual's belief concerning three basic economic questions:
1. Beliefs concerning the role that individual needs should play in determining income.
2. Beliefs concerning how desirable is private ownership of property.
3. Beliefs concerning the role of merit in determining income.
We use five different WVS questions to capture these different dimensions of ideology, starting with the role of needs. Two survey questions ask about attitudes towards poverty and inequality:
1a. "Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions:
which comes closest to your view?" The options are "1. They are poor because of laziness and lack of will-power, OR 2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly." In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life
Hard work doesn't generally bring successit's more a matter of luck and connections.
1e. "Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better-paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it (1) fair or (2) not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?"
Non Economic Beliefs
It is less clear from the literature how a core set of "moral" beliefs that drive left and right choices can be described. Political scientists have argued for the importance of values that emphasize a libertarian/ authoritarian dimension as well as "post materialist" values that focus on quality of life rather than economic preservation (see Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) , Flanagan (1987) , Kitschelt (1994) , inter alia). For example, a representative paper is Knutsen and Kumlin (2005) who identify three central (non-economic) values used in party choice. These are as follows:
1. Beliefs concerning how desirable is the environment/ecology versus growth.
2. Beliefs concerning how desirable is a libertarian versus authoritarian type of society.
Beliefs about the importance of moral values (religious versus secular).
We use five different WVS questions to capture these different dimensions of moral ideology, starting with ecology versus growth orientation beliefs. The questions that appear related to these attitudes are:
2a. "Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent."
2b. "For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views."
The options are "(1) We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition."
It is not so clear how to find survey questions that help to separately capture the other two dimensions of non-economic beliefs (i.e., libertarian/authoritarian tendencies and moral values). The following questions appear to focus on both of these dimensions:
2c. "I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? (1) Jews (2) Capitalists (3) Stalinists/hard line communists (4) Immigrants (5) Homosexuals (6) Criminals (7) Neo-Nazis/Right extremists (or country equivalent)."
2d. "With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? (1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them. (2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes."
The question below appears to more heavily focus on the moral dimension:
2e. "Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card." Card shows a 1 to 10 scale where "(1)=Never justifiable .. (10)=Always justifiable."
Beliefs: Māori and non-Māori in New Zealand Compared
In this section we compare the above economic and non-economic beliefs of Māori and non-Māori across the three waves of the WVS that include New Zealand, which were taken in 1998, 2004 and 2011.
These waves sampled 55, 58 and 60 nations, respectively, around the world. The surveys were carried out by face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older. The We compare the beliefs of those people who identify themselves as Māori (i.e., who tick category
(1)) with those who do not (i.e., who tick one of the categories (2-6)). Of the full sample, 7.7% identify as being Maori.
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Political affiliation is measured by the response to the question, "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Please circle one number". A card shows a scale from 1 to 10, where "1=left .. 10=right". We categorize a person as being 'left' if their response is 1-5 and as 'right' if their response is 6-10.
Economic Beliefs
Table A in the Appendix, compares economic beliefs when the population is divided into two subgroups: Māori and non-Māori. Of Māori, 59.5% believe that people are living in need because society has treated them unfairly and the rest believe that the reason is laziness or lack of will-power (see Table A1 ).
The proportions are similar for Māori men and women. By contrast, 40.6% of non-Māori believe that people in need have been treated unfairly. There are strong differences by political affiliation. Whereas only 30% of the 'right' (National party supporters) believe that need is due to unfair treatment, 58.4% of the 'left' (Labour party supporters) hold this belief. Hence Māori have slightly more "leftist" beliefs than (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., nearly 60% of Māori blame an unfair society compared to 58% of Labour supporters). Table A2 focuses on whether the government is doing too much, the right amount, or too little for people in poverty. Over 82% of Māori believe that the government is doing too little, whereas 51% of non-Māori share this belief. Of Labour supporters, 64.2% believe that too little is being done, compared to 36.7% of National supporters. Consequently, the proportion of Māori who want the government to do more greatly exceeds the proportion of (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., 82% compared to 64%, respectively). Table A3 focusses on a governance issue: how business and industry should be managed. Of
Māori, 54% believe that owners should run their businesses (compared to 46% who believe that businesses should be run by owners and employees together, or by the government, or by employees alone). By contrast, 69% of non-Māori believe that owners should run their businesses. There are strong differences 30 The NZ Census in 2006 asked the following question about ethnicity: "Which ethnic group do you belong to? Mark the space or spaces which apply to you. (1) New Zealand European (2) Māori (3) Samoan (4) Cook Island Māori (5) Tongan (6) Niuean (7) Chinese (8) Indian (9) other such as DUTCH, JAPANESE, TOKELAUAN. Please state". Of all New Zealanders, 14.6% marked "Māori". One reason for this number being higher than our (random) sample of survey respondents is that the WVS asks people to identify themselves in terms of a single ethnic group that includes "a New Zealander first, and a member of some ethnic group second", whereas the NZ census allows people to tick multiple groups. However, Māori may also be under-represented in the WVS as occurs in other non-mandatory surveys.
by party affiliation. Of National supporters, 77% believe that owners should be in charge, compared to 61% of Labour supporters. Consequently, Māori are less supportive of owners running their businesses than (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., 54% compared to 61%, respectively). Table A4 shows the proportions of Māori and non-Māori who believe that "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" versus the alternative that "Hard work doesn't generally bring successit is more a matter of luck and connections". People respond on a 10 point scale, depending on how strongly they hold these beliefs. We report the proportions who tick categories 1-5 (corresponding to hard work bringing a better life) versus the proportions who tick categories 6-10 (corresponding to success being more about luck and connections). Of Māori, 63% believe that hard work does bring a better life and 37% believe it is more about luck. For Māori men, only 59% believe that hard work pays compared to 66% of Māori women. Of non-Māori, nearly 78% believe that hard work pays. As before, Māori beliefs on the role of hard work are to the "left" of Labour supporters (i.e., 37% of Māori believe it is more about luck whereas only 26% of non-Māori Labour voters hold this belief). Table A5 reports beliefs on whether it is fair to pay a more efficient secretary more than a less efficient one who is doing the same job. Of
Māori, 18% believe it is not fair, compared to 8% of non-Māori. when it comes at a cost to economic growth and jobs (i.e., 63% hold this belief). Māori women have a stronger preference in favour of environmental protection than Māori men (i.e., 69% for women compared to 56% for men). Of non-Māori, 45% support protecting the environment as the top priority, with a majority of 55% instead preferring economic growth. Labour and National supporters also have different beliefs on this question, with a majority of the right favoring economic growth as the top priority, whereas a majority of the left instead favor environmental protection. Table B2 focuses on the question of whether tradition should be emphasized over high technology.
Non-Economic Beliefs
Māori are strong traditionalists with 68% in favour, compared to 46% of non-Māori. Amongst non-Māori, the left and right hold similar views. However, there is a difference by gender, with 53% of non-Māori women favouring tradition, compared to 38% of non-Māori men. Table B3 reports that 11.4% of Māori dislike capitalists (more than any other group) whereas only 3.9% of non-Māori hold a similar belief. Table   B4 focuses on the question of whether there is a duty to love and respect one's parents, regardless of their faults, or whether parents must earn respect. Of Māori, 78% believe that one must always respect one's parents, compared to 60% of non-Māori. This latter figure drops to 55% for (non-Māori) Labour supporters. Note that Māori beliefs are closer to those of right-wing (rather than left-wing) non-Māori voters (albeit with considerably greater Māori support for parental respect than even the right-wingers). Table B5 shows the proportions of Māori and non-Māori who believe that "Abortion can never be justified" versus the alternative that "Abortion is always justifiable". People respond on a 10 point scale, depending on how strongly they hold these beliefs. We report the proportions who tick categories 1-5 (i.e., abortion is never justifiable) versus the proportions who tick categories 6-10 (i.e., abortion is always justifiable). Of Māori, 66% believe that abortion is never justifiable, much higher than non-Māori at 55%, and especially (non-Māori) Labour voters at 51%. Again, Māori are closer to right-leaning voters with respect to this attitude, and again with a more marked view. Tables C1-5 and Tables D1-5 report the comparable figures for the economic and non-economic beliefs of Americans, divided by (black and non-black) ethnicity, as a benchmark.
Results: Ethnicity and Beliefs
The previous section revealed differences between Māori and non-Māori in terms of their economic and non-economic beliefs. However these differences may not be caused by ethnicity, but instead by some other variable that is correlated with ethnicity. For example, if Māori are more highly represented in lower income and education groups, or have higher rates of unemployment, then their different beliefs (when compared to non-Māori) may be driven by these kinds of factors, and not by ethnicity per se.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy to find the determinants of these beliefs is to correlate them with each individual's ethnicity, whilst also controlling for personal characteristics. We use a sample that covers the where Beliefit refers to one of our set of economic or non-economic beliefs of individual, i, in year, t.
With respect to economic beliefs, we define the variable, Unfair for Poor-L, to equal 0 if the response is that people are poor "because of laziness or lack of will power", and 1 if it is because "society treats them unfairly" (see question (1a) in Section 3.1). The extension -L indicates that under the natural interpretation of the variable, higher values are associated with a more left-wing ideological placement.
Our second variable, Government help Poor-L, is defined to equal 0 when the response is that the government is doing either "too much", or "about the right amount", for those in poverty, and 1 if the response is that it is doing "too little" (see question (1b)). Business Ownership-L is set equal to 0 if the response is that "owners should run their business or appoint the managers" and 1 if it is "owners and employees should participate in the selection managers" or "the government should be the owner" or "employees should own the business" (see question (1c)). The variable, Luck not Work-L, is defined over a cardinal 1-10 scale based on the extent to which a person believes that "hard work usually brings a better life" (=1) versus the view that "hard work doesn't generally bring success -it is more about luck and connections" (=10) (see question (1d)). Finally we define the dummy, Fair Pay-L, to equal 0 if the respondent answers that it is "fair" for a less efficient secretary to be paid less than a "quicker, more efficient and more reliable" secretary and 1 if it is "unfair" (see question (1e)).
With respect to our set of non-economic beliefs, we define the variable, Environment-L, to equal 0 if the response is that "economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers" and 1 if it is "protecting the environment should be given priority" (see question (2a) 
Each person's income is proxied by Personal Income Quintileit which refers to a set of five dummies
corresponding to each of the income quintiles (the base category is the bottom quintile). Work Statusit is a set of dummies that correspond to whether one is unemployed, retired, a student, or at home (the base category is employed). We also include the dummy, Maleit, and one's age. Finally, we control for each person's Education levelit, which refers to a set of dummies depending on whether one has completed primary, high school or university education (the base category is primary). Year dummies (YEARt) are included and the (i.i.d.) error term is it . The appendix provides data definitions.
Results -New Zealand
In Table 1 unfairly, compared to non-Māori, significant at the 1 percent level (i.e., the leftist belief is supported by Māori). There is a monotonically decreasing chance of believing in unfair treatment as one goes up the income quintiles, with the top quintile being 15.3% less likely to share this belief compared to people in the bottom quintile. By contrast, the unemployed (and students) are 22.8% (and 18.6%) more likely to support the idea that the poor are being treated unfairly, significant at the 1 percent level.
Column (2) reports the results when the dependent variable is Government help Poor-L. In this instance, Māori are 30.0% more likely to respond that the Government is doing "too little" for those in need. (i.e., the leftist belief is supported by Māori). The unemployed have a 19.2% higher chance of wanting more government help for the poor (compared to the employed) and there is again a monotonically decreasing chance of supporting the leftist belief as one goes up the income quintiles.
Column (3) reports the results for Business Ownership-L. Māori are 12.6% more likely to support the belief that business and industry should not be run by the owners, or their appointed managers, compared to non-Māori. Column (4) shows that Māori are more likely to believe that success is driven by luck and connections than work, significant at the 1 per cent level, and the size of the effect is equal to moving 0.60 units on a (cardinal) 10 point scale. 31 Alternatively, if one creates a new binary variable by assigning the survey responses from 1-5 to a single category called "work", and the survey responses from 6-10 to a single category called "luck", then Māori are 11.5 percentage points more likely to believe that success is driven by luck. Finally, column (5) shows that Māori are 5.9% more likely than non-Māori to believe that it is not fair for a more efficient and more reliable secretary to be paid more than another doing the same job. Those with a high school or University education tend to hold the opposite view, and are 4.3% and 6.4% less likely, respectively, to hold this belief. Similarly, those people in the higher income quintiles and males are also less likely to say that paying the better secretary more is unfair.
In summary, across all of our measures of economic beliefs, Māori are significantly more in favour of the leftist belief compared to non-Māori, after controlling for other personal characteristics. The sizes of the effects are large. In other words, there appears to be a pure "ethnicity" effect. Another WVS question that appears to focus on libertarian vs authoritarian tendencies and moral values is the following: "For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views.
(1) To build good human relationships it is most important to try to understand other's preferences, or (2) To build good human relationships it is most important to express one's own preferences clearly". Māori are 14.1% more likely to respond that its most important to express one's own preferences clearly, compared to non-Māori, after controlling for our set of personal characteristics. 33 If instead each of the 10 survey responses are treated as discrete and an ordered probit regression is run, then the cut points (standard errors) are equal to -1.1 (0.2), -0.9 (0.2), -0.7 (0.2), -0.5 (0.2), -0.03 (0.2), 0.3 (0.2), 0.5 (0.2), 1.0 (0.2) and 1.2 (0.2). 34 Regression results show similar Māori conservatism regarding other moral issues like homosexuality.
Further Tests: Time Trends and Demographic Differences
In this section we test for whether there are trends in the economic and non-economic beliefs of
Māori, compared to non-Māori, over the period from 1998 to 2011, by interacting a time trend with our ethnicity variable. That is, we run the following regressions for each of our beliefs:
where Personal Characteristicsit refers to our income, work status, sex, age and education level controls. With respect to economic beliefs, the only significant trend detected is the increasing support by Māori for the government to do more to help the poor (compared to non-Māori). Between 1998 and 2011 the proportion of Māori believing that "too little" is being done for those in poverty rose from 81.1% to 83.6%. However over the same period the proportion of non-Māori holding this belief fell from 61.0% to 36.2%. With respect to non-economic beliefs, none showed any evidence of a significant time trend (consistent with the idea that many cultural traits are slow moving).
One can also test for whether the differences in beliefs between Māori and non-Māori vary according to, for example, age and education levels, by interacting our personal characteristic controls (see equation (1)) with the ethnicity variable. The evidence suggests that younger Māori (<50 years old) are less inclined to support their elders' view that the government should do more to support those in poverty, whereas for non-Māori, age has no effect. 35 Furthermore, although a university education is associated with being more pro-environment (over economic growth) for non-Māori, it is not associated with making any difference to the beliefs of Māori.
Results -United States
Tables 3 and 4 report the corresponding set of results for the US, where the ethnicity variable is now defined according to whether one is a black, or non-black, American. In Table 3 , blacks are significantly more likely to support the belief that people live in need because society has treated them unfairly (see column (1)) and also that the government is doing too little to help those in poverty (see column (2)). In other words, their beliefs are in the "leftist" direction, similar to Māori in NZ, with respect to these two questions. However in columns (3-4) there are no significant differences between black and non-black Americans in terms of how business and industry should be managed, and of whether or not hard work brings success. Finally, in column (5), black Americans are 9.6% more likely (significant at the 1% level) to support the belief that a more efficient secretary should be paid the same as a less efficient one, compared to non-black Americans (i.e., the more "leftist" belief). Table 4 presents the results for our set of non-economic beliefs. In column (1), blacks are 20.5% less likely to believe that protecting the environment should be given priority, preferring instead economic 35 Results available on request.
growth and jobs. In columns (2-3) there are no significant differences between blacks and non-blacks with respect to Tradition vs show that black Americans are more likely to favour the authoritarian belief that one must always respect one's parents, regardless of their qualities, and are also more likely to hold conservative beliefs on moral issues like abortion. With respect to non-economic beliefs there are even more striking differences. Black Americans are significantly less likely to believe that the environment should be given top priority, compared to nonblacks, whereas Māori hold the opposite belief, compared to non-Māori. Furthermore, whereas Māori favour more tradition over high technology, and consider capitalists to be more threatening to the social order than other groups, no such effects are present for blacks. In other words, Māori may be described as having more "leftist" beliefs, compared to non-Māori, across all three of these questions, whereas blacks have more "rightist" beliefs than non-blacks on the environment and there are no differences on the role of tradition and the desirability of capitalists. Finally, both Māori and blacks more strongly believe that parents should be respected, regardless of whether they've earned it, and that abortion is not justifiable, compared to others in their respective countries.
Implications and Conclusions
A growing body of international research establishes that individual, group and national outcomes depend, in part, on culture and institutions. Within NZ, national institutions are uniformly adopted, but sub-national cultural norms have sharply different distributions that are related to ethnicity. We make no normative assessment about the merits of different cultural norms within ethnic groups. However, we can provide some positive assessments about the economic implications that flow from them.
While there are large overlaps between Māori and non-Māori beliefs, our results suggest that Māori are more likely to believe: (a) people are in need because society is unfair; (b) government is doing too little to help people in poverty; (c) owners should not run businesses by themselves; (d) luck and connections matter more than hard work for success; (e) it is not fair to be paid more for better performance whilst doing the same job as someone else; and (f) capitalists are more threatening to society than other groups.
These views are consistent with a 'left-wing' view of economic relations. Māori are also statistically more likely to consider that: (g) the environment should get priority over economic growth. On other matters, Māori are relatively conservative, favoring: (h) an emphasis on tradition over technology; (i) respect for one's parents no matter what their faults; and (j) a view that abortion cannot be justified. Overall, our findings suggest that Māori beliefs are more aligned with giving importance to collectivism, nonmaterialism, the environment and kinship ties, relative to non-Māori.
When we compare the NZ outcomes with the American ones, we find both significant cases of agreement and disagreement. Black Americans' beliefs (relative to non-blacks) concur with those of Māori (relative to non-Māori) for the economic questions relating to poverty and fairness [(a), (b) and (e) above].
They also concur with those of Māori for the moral questions relating to parental respect and abortion.
However, unlike within NZ, the questions relating to business ownership, luck versus work, capitalists as a threatening group and tradition versus technology [(c), (d), (f) and (h)] show no ethnic divide (statistically) within the US. In other words, black Americans appear to have bought into the capitalist system more than Māori (relative to the dominant group). Importantly, and in stark contrast to Māori, black Americans favour economic growth over the environment, possibly reflecting the fact that Māori consider themselves native to NZ whereas black Americans trace their roots to a different continent.
We cannot say whether the determinants of Māori beliefs that are less favourable to capitalism predate the colonisation experience, or are related to historical injustices and grievances, or are related to more recent experiences of discrimination. 36 Whatever the cause, the international literature suggests that some of the gap between Māori and non-Māori economic outcomes may be attributed to cultural differences in values and beliefs. In particular, a belief that luck and connections is more important to personal advancement (than is hard work) can lead to lower personal levels of achievement and less social mobility.
Emphasis on family (and kinship) respect can lead to more family-owned firms that tend to under-perform other firm types (due to governance and capital constraints). An emphasis on tradition over technology is likely to inhibit innovation and entrepreneurship. Similarly, giving priority to the environmental over economic growth can inhibit commercial exploitation of Māori-owned natural resources relative to nonMāori (although we are not aware of any research on this factor). Each of these elements is consistent with the finding that Māori economic outcomes and many social outcomes (e.g., for health) suffer relative to those of non-Māori, even after controlling for family structure and education.
A recent literature in economics has begun to try to explain the causes of cultural beliefs. For example, personal experience of private ownership of property can strengthen materialist and individualist beliefs and make people more pro-market (see Di Tella, Galiani and Shargrodsky, 2007) . 37 This finding raises the prospect that allocating shares in collective vehicles like Māori Trusts to individual iwi members may assist in changing beliefs in favour of the free market for those who receive shares. However, historical experience of land-loss through the sale of dissipated Māori ownership of land may be a constraint on 36 Planned future research using the Statistics New Zealand Te Kupenga survey will enable us to control better for such issues (at both an individual and an iwi level) although the beliefs and values questions unfortunately differ from those in the WVS. 37 See also Guilinao and Spilimbergo (2014) who find people who have experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck and connections than merit, support more government redistribution, and tend to vote for left-wing parties. Di Tella, Dubra and MacCulloch (2010) show how greater dependence on oil leads to a similar set of beliefs (that diminish the role of individualism). Similarly, corruption also undermines the belief that effort ultimately pays off and that everyone gets their just desserts, leading to a greater demand for government intervention to punish the undeserving capitalists (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009). following this path. Cultural heros are sometimes considered to affect beliefs about whether the world is just. To the extent that American blacks consider examples, like Barack Obama, as providing demonstrable evidence of advancement depending on individual effort, their belief in the 'American dream' may be strengthened. Interestingly, our survey evidence suggests that American blacks are significantly more likely than Māori in NZ to believe that effort matters (see Tables A4 and C4 and column (4) in Tables 1 and 3 ).
Our survey evidence showing that significant differences between Māori and non-Māori exist across every category of economic and non-economic belief also has relevance for crafting institutions within NZ. Given this dispersion of beliefs, creating a common set of rules for the whole population becomes harder. A number of studies demonstrate that there is greater adherence to rules at national, local and workplace levels when those affected by decisions are involved in the drafting of the rules (see, for example, Bardhan, 2000; Frey, 1998; . When there is a minority indigenous ethnicity that has different cultural norms from the mainstream and is not heavily involved in the mainstream political process, this research suggests the need for special efforts to engage that group in the drafting of rules that affect all of society. NZ legislation over recent decades has tended to formalise such an approach. 38 Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the responsibility of councils to extend beyond consultation. Resource Management Act case law (which deals especially with environmental outcomes) establishes that local authorities have a responsibility to incorporate tangata whenua (local Māori) interests into their decision-making. Such consultation and responsibilities may help to ensure that cultural traits that are of special importance to Māori are encapsulated in national institutions.
With respect to the design of Māori enterprises (at the sub-national level) one may expect to see a strong reflection of the cultural differences identified by our survey data. 39 Our findings that Māori beliefs are more aligned with collectivism, non-materialism and kinship ties, compared to non-Māori, may explain why Māori enterprises are built more on a stakeholder, than a shareholder, approach (the latter being the dominant form of governance of larger firms in NZ). Although the stakeholder model has advantages in terms of balancing diverse parties' interests, there are arguments that it comes at the expense of economic efficiency (since stakeholder firms no longer become focussed on the singular goal of raising shareholder returns). 40 However, to the extent that the 'Māori economy' is being built around institutions that are consistent with Māori beliefs, those institutions may still be optimal in the sense of maximising overall well-being (which may depend on a broader set of outcomes than solely monetary ones). Denzau and North (1994) who argue how "institutions clearly are a reflection of the evolving mental models". 40 For a discussion of different kinds of governance systems, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , who ask "How effective is the political and economic market place in delivering efficient governance? .. While our survey has described some evidence in this area from the US, our understanding of the politics of corporate governance around the world remains extremely limited" (pg 774). 41 Two prominent Māori academics, Love and Love (2014) , state: "Māori businesses tended to have a wide range of structures in the early 2000s, ranging from a conventional business structure (such as a sole trader, partnership or company) to a marae-, whānau-or iwi-based structure. These businesses did not always follow the generally accepted economic models of best managerial or commercial practice. Collectively owned tribal-based structures sometimes impeded efficient decision-making, management and reporting. … Cultural and social issues, such as the dependence of family groups on business for financial support or employment, often affected Māori businesses and their
One method adopted by some iwi to enhance efficiencies from their holdings of tribal assets has been to form a fully iwi-owned investment entity that is responsible primarily to maximise returns. However while these structures draw attention to the wealth-creation role of these two organisations (a major factor in guiding their commercial decisions) they still operate within a framework of monopoly kin-based ownership that is not subject to external accountability. The corporate finance literature shows how the threat of external takeover may be important to ensure that returns are maximised. 44 If a firm under-performs then equity holders typically have the right to replace management, but when ownership is disperse, each individual equity holder has little incentive to monitor the actions of management or the directors closely. 45 Consequently, provided a firm's shares can be traded, an important disciplining mechanism is the threat of takeover. 46 The lower level of corporate takeovers in continental Europe compared to the US and UK is often linked to differences between the Anglo-Saxon shareholder and the Continental European stakeholder approach to governance. 47 Stakeholders, like employees, who may be affected by a takeover, may not wish one to succeed. In a similar way, the stakeholder emphasis of entities in the 'Māori economy' may be resulting in an aversion to takeover threats.
To improve the efficiency of Māori Trusts, whilst retaining certain institutional features that reflect
Māori beliefs and values, other paths adopted by related organisations may be worthy of consideration.
One alternative is that followed by NZ's largest agricultural cooperative, Fonterra. The dairy cooperative chances of succeeding. The 'tātou tātou' (we all look after each other) philosophy often makes it hard for Māori business owners to say no when asked to give away products or services." 42 See: http://www.tgh.co.nz/. 43 See: http://www.ngaitahuholdings.co.nz/group-profile/. 44 With uncertainty, although internal decision-making within a firm can often prove superior to, and more flexible than, external contracting, it is also capable of resulting in decisions that favour decision-makers' interests over shareholders. Typically, investors are interested in cash-flows from the firm, whereas management also have an interest in the private benefits that they can derive (see Hart, 2001) . Private benefits include prestige, patronage and (legal, but inefficient) diversion of funds to other projects by way of contract. 45 This economic concept of ownership as control, rather than as one of residual profit recipient, is close to the Māori concept of tino rangatiratanga. 46 Evidence of the positive effects of the takeover threat on firm performance is widespread (for useful surveys, see Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001 ). Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001 , find that, prior to the rise in takeover activity in the 1980s, managers were loyal more to the corporation than to shareholders while boards "tended to be cosy with management, making board oversight weak". Even those firms that were not actually taken over often decided to restructure in response to hostile takeover pressure. See also Shleifer, 1998, and Megginson and Netter, 2001 , for evidence of improved corporate performance following privatization of state owned corporations (with potential for subsequent takeover). 47 See Clerc, Demarigny, de Manuel and Valiante (2012) who discuss the relation between governance systems and the takeover market.
introduced shares that are tradeable only amongst eligible farmers, whilst other investors, who are not eligible to own shares in Fonterra, can invest in the Fonterra Shareholders' Fund (FSF) that gives investors access to the economic (but not governance) rights that they would have received had they owned a Fonterra share. Both the share-trading between farmers and access to the FSF has resulted in greater scrutiny of the organisation's performance by shareowners and market analysts. Another alternative is the partial sale of assets, while retaining majority ownership within the iwi. This alternative was followed by the NZ government in the sale of 49% of each of three major electricity suppliers formerly in full state ownership. Again, the listing of the shares -while retaining ultimate control within the state -has lifted scrutiny of firm performance by shareowners and market analysts.
In conclusion, this paper firstly uses new survey evidence to identify starkly different distributions in cultural beliefs and values between Māori and non-Māori. These cultural traits, which tend to be less pro-market for Māori, are often associated with lower economic prosperity. Secondly, the paper discusses how the design of the formal institutions that govern the 'Māori economy' appear to somewhat reflect those beliefs (which emphasize collectivism, non-materialism, environmental concerns and kinship). These formal institutions, many of which are new, will in turn shape economic outcomes and cultural beliefs in the future. The extent to which they will improve overall Māori well-being (which depends not only on income but also on non-economic factors, like the environment and kinship) is an open question. Only by furthering this kind of explicit understanding of the role of culture and institutions, can we construct paths to economic development for all New Zealanders that reflect the diversity of beliefs and values within the country. (4)).
Luck not Work-L: "How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you agree completely with the statement on the left; '10' means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 1. In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life; 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 Note: Columns (1), (2), (3) and (5) are probit regressions with marginal probabilities reported. Columns (2), (3) and (4) 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6, 7, 8, 9, 10 In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life
Same Pay-L: Response to the WVS question: "Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? (1) Fair or (2) Not fair." (Fair Pay-L is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)).
Non-Economic Beliefs
Environment-L:
Response to the WVS question: "Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (2). Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent." (Environment-L is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)).
Tradition vs Technology-L:
Response to the WVS question: "For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views.
(1) We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition." (Tradition vs Technology-L is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). (2)).
Capitalists-L:
Abortion-L:
Response to the WVS question: "Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where (1)=Never justifiable, (10)=Always justifiable." 
